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Introduction
At its best, the system of agency decision-making in the U.S.
administrative-law tradition balances two countervailing impulses:
democratic accountability and expert decision-making. This balance has
largely been achieved over the past several decades through the
construction of a set of guardrails that give a limited scope to political
influence, while keeping that influence within acceptable bounds.1
One of the most important of these guardrails, which has been in
place since 1981, is the requirement that administrative agencies
conduct cost–benefit analyses of major rulemakings.2 Cost–benefit
analysis creates a formal process for the simple idea that agencies ought
to do their best to anticipate and evaluate the consequences of their
decisions and seek out rules with the largest possible benefits at the
lowest possible cost. The use of cost–benefit analysis to evaluate
environmental regulations has a long history in the United States and

†

Michael A. Livermore is a professor of law at the University of Virginia
School of Law. This Article is drawn from remarks at the Case Western
Reserve Law Review’s symposium marking the Environmental Protection
Agency’s fiftieth anniversary, as well as my testimony before the
Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations House Committee on Energy
and Commerce on May 21, 2019. Thanks to Jack Leinke and Richard L.
Revesz, as well as the symposium’s participants, for helpful feedback.

1.

Michael A. Livermore & Daniel Richardson, Administrative Law in an
Era of Partisan Volatility, 69 Emory L. J. 1, 72–73 (2019).

2.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).
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has been embraced by administration of both political parties for
decades.3
Over the years, this guardrail has become particularly important as
agencies have developed a set of consistent methodologies for carrying
out cost–benefit analyses. The peer-reviewed Guidelines for Preparing
Economic Analyses, created by the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), contains a set of best practices that have been painstakingly
developed over the years.4 Another important touchstone for
conducting economic analysis that applies more generally is Circular
A-4, which was developed by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) during George W. Bush’s administration.5
A value of these best practices is in maintaining consistency across
agency decisions. One major critique leveled against the practice of costbenefit analysis is that it is vulnerable to manipulation by agencies that
want to create ad hoc rationalizations for policy choices that are based
on political expediency.6 Well-established best practices reduce this
threat because they create a clear standard that can be used to hold
agencies accountable: if an agency departs from established methods,
that raises a red flag, alerting the public to the possibility of mani–
pulation. The larger the departure from established practice, the
stronger the reason the agency should be able to provide.
Cost-benefit analyses help protect expert decision-making from
undue political influence in two ways. First, it creates the general
principle that agencies should examine the positive and negative effects
of regulatory proposals and seek out the ones with the greatest net
benefits. Agencies’ decisions can be held up to that standard in light of
the information that is collected and disclosed in their required
regulatory-impact statements. Second, consistent methodologies pro–
vide a means for the public to understand when politics might be
playing too large of a role in an agency’s decision-making. When an
agency feels the need to depart from standard practices without a very
strong justification, the public is alerted to the risk that political
considerations may be intruding too far into how an agency is
conducting its business.
Although some at the EPA initially resisted the move to cost–
benefit analysis, the Agency soon realized that it was better to learn
3.

Richard L. Revesz & Michael A. Livermore, Retaking
Rationality: How Cost-Benefit Analysis Can Better Protect
the Environment and Our Health 31–32 (2008).

4.

See generally EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses
(2010).

5.

See generally Office of Mgmt.
Regulatory Analysis (2003).

6.

See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On
Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value of Nothing
(2004).
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how to conduct strong assessments of its proposals than to try to resist
the practice.7 As a consequence, significant resources at the Agency
were devoted to building out a world-class environmental economics
team and developing methods that would be able to rigorously analyze
environmental rules.8 In particular, the EPA’s rules often protect values
that are not directly traded on markets, such as public health and
ecosystems. Over the years, the Agency, under administrations of both
political parties, has had considerable success in developing techniques
to value these non-market benefits.9
Part of the reason that cost–benefit analysis works well at the EPA
is that there is a clear economic justification for environmental pro–
tections. Many of the activities regulated by the Agency generate
externalities that are not well-accounted for in markets. Pollution
creates costs that are borne by the public, which means that private
parties will not appropriately take them into account. The EPA’s rules
help correct for this market failure. Over the years, the EPA has
adopted rules that have truly staggering net benefits for the public—
many billions of dollars of value in terms of public health, protected
ecosystems, and fuel savings due to energy-efficiency measures. Of
course, these benefits come at a cost because companies have to devote
resources to pollution control. But the benefits of the EPA’s rules
frequently swamp the costs, sometimes by orders of magnitude.
But the Agency’s tradition of conducting cost–benefit analyses and
delivering massive net benefits to the public cannot be taken for
granted. Unfortunately, the Trump Administration has taken a number
of steps that represent a radical break with the methodological practices
used by past administrations of both political parties. This break does
not merely raise a red flag for a single rule—it broadcasts that cost–
benefit analysis is no longer playing its traditional role of protecting the
Agency from inappropriate political influence.
This Article focuses on one example of this trend. In 2011, the
Obama Administration adopted a rule to reduce mercury and other air
toxics emitted by the electricity-generating sector.10 This rule is known
as the Mercury and Air Toxics Standard (MATS). When the EPA
published that rule, its economic analysis—which used long established
methods—projected $9.6 billion per year in compliance costs and
7.

Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence,
81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 609, 687–88 (2014).

8.

Id. at 624–28.

9.

EPA, supra note 4, at 7–21.

10.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-CommercialInstitutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9303 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).
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between $37 billion and $90 billion per year in quantifiable benefits, in
addition to substantial unquantified health and environmental bene–
fits.11 Under the Trump Administration, however, the EPA has reversed
course and issued a proposal to undo its earlier finding that controlling
these air pollutants was “appropriate and necessary.”12 If successful,
this move would undermine the legal support for the MATS rule. In its
explanation for why it seeks to revoke its earlier appropriate-andnecessary determination, the Trump EPA contradicts the relevant
guidance and decades of practice by previous administrations (of both
political parties) by functionally ignoring the largest class of benefits
associated with the MATS Rule: saving thousands of Americans’ lives.13
The result is a biased and misleading estimate that creates the false
impression that the MATS rule was not justified in cost–benefit terms.
The grounds that the EPA provides for functionally ignoring these
benefits is that they are indirect co-benefits resulting from reduced
exposure to particulate matter. These particulate-matter benefits occur
as a result of the pollution-control technologies used by firms to comply
with the MATS rule. But the OMB’s Circular A-4 and the EPA’s own
peer-reviewed guidance on conducting cost-benefit analyses direct the
Agency to analyze both indirect costs and benefits.14 Since President
Reagan, the EPA has counted co-benefits in many regulatory contexts,
including clean-air rules.15
The Agency fails to provide any adequate reason for this
extraordinary and abnormal treatment of co-benefits. Nothing in either
the relevant case law or the relevant statute requires the Agency to
functionally ignore tens of billions of dollars’ worth of regulatory
benefits. If anything, the relevant case—Michigan v. EPA16—inter–
preted the statute to require the Agency to engage in a broad analysis
of the costs and benefits of the rule, exactly the opposite of what the
Agency is proposing to do.17 If finalized and adopted, the EPA’s
proposal would not only undermine a socially desirable environmental
policy, it would create a dangerous precedent of an agency departing
from established methods when it is convenient to do so.

11.

EPA, Regulatory Impact Analysis for the Final Mercury and
Air Toxics Standards (2011).

12.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants From Coaland Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units—Reconsideration
of Supplemental Finding and Residual Risk and Technology Review, 84
Fed. Reg. 2670, 2670 (Feb. 7, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).

13.

See id.

14.

See infra Part II.

15.

See infra Part II.

16.

135 S. Ct. 2699 (2015).

17.

Id. at 2711.
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Cost-benefit analysis has survived as long as it has because
administrations of both political parties were willing to play by the
rules. An analogy might be drawn to the prisoners’ dilemma, in which
two strategic actors are collectively better off cooperating than de–
fecting but short-term incentives push each individual actor towards
defecting. By defecting from the long-term agreement to carry out costbenefit analyses within the range of accepted norms, the Trump Ad–
ministration has destabilized what was a very beneficial cooperative
equilibrium. In doing so, it runs the risk of initiating a downward spiral
of norm violations that renders economic analysis incapable of serving
its traditional role of pushing back against overly intrusive political
influence.
The balance of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a
brief overview of the role cost-benefit analysis plays in the regulatory
process. Part II describes the procedural history of the MATS rule and
the EPA’s appropriate-and necessary-determination regarding that
rule. Part III describes the role of co-benefits in prior EPA rulemakings
as well as in the MATS rule. Part IV discusses the Trump EPA’s radical
departure from prior practice in its proposal to revoke the previous
MATS appropriate-and necessary-determination. And Part V offers
some concluding thoughts that contextualize the treatment of cobenefits in the MATS rule within a larger trend of the Trump
Administration rejecting long-standing norms governing the role of
cost-benefit analysis in agencies’ decision-making.

I. Cost–Benefit Analysis and Regulation
The use of cost–benefit analysis to evaluate environmental regula–
tions has a long history in the United States. Although there are
important precursors,18 the central place of cost–benefit analysis in
federal regulatory decision-making can be traced to Executive Order
12,291, signed by President Ronald Reagan shortly after taking office
in 1981.19 Under that order, agencies were required to conduct a
regulatory-impact analysis of proposed rules with significant economic
consequences and to submit those analyses to the White House’s Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review.20 The Reagan
order’s purported goals were to “increase agency accountability for
regulatory actions” and “insure well-reasoned regulations.”21 Order

18.

Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s Formative Years: The Historical Record of
Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding, 63 Admin.
L. Rev. (Special Edition) 37, 40–62 (2011) (giving a historical overview
of cost-benefit-type review before the Reagan administration).

19.

Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981).

20.

Id.

21.

Id.
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12,291 established general guidelines for conducting Regulatory Impact
Analysis, requiring each analysis to contain the following:
(1) A description of the potential benefits of the rule, including
any beneficial effects that cannot be quantified in monetary
terms . . . ;
(2) A description of the potential costs of the rule, including any
adverse effects that cannot be quantified in monetary
terms . . . ; [and]
(3) A determination of the potential net benefits of the rule,
including an evaluation of effects that cannot be quantified in
monetary terms . . . .22

In 1993, President Bill Clinton issued an updated version of
Reagan’s order that left intact the basic architecture of regulatory
impact assessment and OIRA review.23 Among the regulatory principles
embraced by the Clinton order is a directive to agencies to “assess both
the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and, recognizing
that some costs and benefits are difficult to quantify, propose or adopt
a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of
the intended regulation justify its costs.”24 Subsequent Presidents have
proceeded under the Clinton order, continuing the tradition of costbenefit analysis and regulatory review for nearly four decades.25
The requirement to perform a cost–benefit analysis creates a formal
process for a simple idea: agencies ought to do their best to anticipate
and evaluate the consequences of their decisions. The cost–benefit
standard pushes agencies toward decisions that maximize net benefits
by seeking out rules with the largest possible benefits at the lowest
possible cost.
But although the idea of a cost–benefit analysis might be straight–
forward, accurately estimating and valuing the wide range of effects

22.

Id. § 3(d).

23.

See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).

24.

Id. § 1(b)(6).

25.

President George W. Bush made only minor changes to the Clinton Order
at the end of his term. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763,
2673 (Jan. 23, 2007). President Obama’s executive order on regulatory
review explicitly adopts the framework of the Clinton order. See Exec.
Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821, 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011). The Trump
administration purports to operate under Executive Order 12,866 as well.
See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President,
M-17-21, Guidance Implementing Executive Order 13771, Titled
“Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs”
(2017).
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from major rules is no easy task.26 Over the four decades of cost-benefitanalysis practice, agencies have developed a number of methods and
approaches for conducting Regulatory Impact Analyses. These best
practices have been collected in relevant guidance documents, such as
Circular A-4,27 published by the Office of Management and Budget
during the George W. Bush administration, and the EPA’s peerreviewed Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses.28
Best practices for cost-benefit analyses serve several roles. Most
obviously, they conserve agency resources by providing a set of
standardized approaches that can be applied in many different
regulatory contexts. But they also serve a second purpose of
maintaining consistency across an agency’s decisions. One major
critique leveled against the practice of cost–benefit analysis is that its
technical nature makes it vulnerable to manipulation. Were an agency
to decide on a regulatory course of action on other grounds—such as
political expediency—the concern is that the agency could construct a
plausible-seeming cost-benefit justification for its decision that would
be difficult for non-experts to evaluate. Well-established methodological
best practices mitigate this threat by creating a relatively clear
standard that can be used to hold agencies accountable: if an agency
departs from established methods, it raises a red flag, alerting the public
and oversight officials to the possibility of manipulation. The larger the
departure from established practice, the stronger the reason the agency
should be able to provide for that departure.
Over the years, cost–benefit analysis has been used to evaluate and
improve a host of regulatory decisions, including the EPA’s. That
agency especially has made substantial investments to improve its
capacity to carry out cost–benefit analyses of environmental
regulations, and the professional career staff at the Agency has
considerable experience with and expertise for this demanding task.29

II. The Appropriate-and-Necessary Determination and
the MATS Rule
Regulation of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs) under the Clean Air
Act has a long and somewhat tortured history. The original version of
the relevant statutory provision—§ 112—led to an ineffective

26.

There is uncertainty associated with estimates of both costs and benefits
and agencies often make conservative assumptions in light of that
uncertainty.

27.

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 5.

28.

EPA, supra note 4.

29.

Livermore, supra note 7, at 630–32.
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regulatory scheme that addressed only a handful of pollutants.30 These
disappointing results led Congress to revisit HAPs in the 1990 Clean
Air Amendments, and to adopt the current version of § 112.31 The basic
structure of the contemporary § 112 process begins with a list of HAPs
and then requires the EPA to publish a list of categories of sources that
emit HAPs in significant quantities.32 The EPA must then set emissions
standards for those categories.33
Section 112(n), however, creates a special process for electricgenerating units (EGUs). Under this special process, the EPA must first
study the public health hazards of HAP emissions from EGUs, and then
proceed with regulation only upon a finding that “such regulation is
appropriate and necessary after considering the results of the study.”34
This special process has its own lengthy regulatory history. In 2000,
the Clinton-era EPA found, on the basis of its public health study, that
it was appropriate and necessary to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs
because those emissions “present[] significant hazards to public health
and the environment.”35 Later, the George W. Bush administration
attempted to substitute an alternative cap-and-trade regulatory
approach under § 111(d) of the Act for the technology-based approach
of § 112; and in its Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR) purported to
remove EGUs from the § 112 list. This decision was ultimately
invalidated by the D.C. Circuit.36
Under President Obama, the EPA returned to the question of HAP
emissions from EGUs. After conducting an extensive review of the
public-health science on the effects of HAP emissions, the Agency again
made an appropriate-and-necessary determination and, accordingly,
issued the MATS rule setting emissions standards.37 Although the D.C.
30.

Alan J. Goldberg, Toward Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air
Pollutants under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
612, 613–14 (1988).

31.

See Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2012).

32.

Id. § 7412(c)(1). Major sources are those that emit or have the potential
to emit at least ten tons of any HAP per year or at least twenty-five tons
of any combination of HAPs per year. Id. § 7412(a)(1). Area sources are
all other stationary sources of HAPs. Id. § 7412(a)(2).

33.

Id. § 7412(d)(1).

34.

Id. § 7412(n).

35.

Notice of Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air
Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg.
79,825, 79,826–30 (Dec. 20, 2000).

36.

New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 582–83 (D.C. Cir. 2008).

37.

See National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coaland Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and Standards of
Performance for Fossil-Fuel-Fired Electric Utility, Industrial-CommercialInstitutional, and Small Industrial-Commercial-Institutional Steam
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Circuit upheld both the EPA’s finding and the emissions standards,38
the Supreme Court subsequently remanded the appropriate-andnecessary finding on the grounds that the EPA failed to consider costs
before making it.39
In response to the Court’s ruling, the EPA reassessed its
appropriate-and-necessary finding in 2016 (“2016 Finding”). Taking
costs into account—as required under Michigan v. EPA—the Agency
decided to reaffirm its prior decision.40 The 2016 Finding examined the
costs of regulating EGUs under § 112 according to an overallreasonableness standard based on compliance costs relative to the size
of the industry and the cost–benefit information contained in the
Regulatory Impact Analysis of the MATS rule.41 As noted above, that
analysis projected that the MATS rule would impose $9.6 billion per
year in compliance costs, but yield between $37 billion and $90 billion
per year in quantifiable benefits, in addition to many other positive
health and environmental effects that were not quantified.
The largest category of quantified benefits from the MATS rule
arises from the reduction of mortality risk. The EPA anticipated that
between 4,200 and 11,000 premature deaths would be avoided per year.
Other anticipated health benefits of the rule included fewer nonfatal
heart attacks and hospitalizations for respiratory and cardiovascular
disease, as well as reductions in the incidence of a range of harmful
neurological conditions, including IQ loss and developmental delays. In
addition, there were considerable environmental benefits, including
reductions in damage to ecosystems, enhanced visibility, and improve–
ments in recreational and commercial fishing, agricultural yields, and
forest productivity. The rule’s anticipated costs were primarily
associated with capital upgrades to pollution-control technology.
The Trump administration has now proposed to rescind the 2016
Finding.

Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).
38.

White Stallion Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1231–33 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).

39.

Michigan v. EPA, 136 S. Ct 2699, 2711 (2015) (noting that the EPA had
conducted a regulatory-impact analysis of the MATS Rule, not the
appropriate-and-necessary finding).

40.

Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,420 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).

41.

Id. at 24,422–23.
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III. Indirect Costs and Benefits
In the preamble to the MATS rule, the EPA noted that the “great
majority” of the quantified benefits of the rule were “attributable to cobenefits from reductions in [particulate matter]-related mortality.”42 In
the 2016 Finding, the Agency explained the relationship between the
HAP emissions regulation and particulate matter:
[I]nstalling control technologies and implementing the compliance
strategies necessary to reduce the HAP emissions directly
regulated by the MATS rule also results in concomitant (cobenefit) reductions in the emissions of other pollutants such as
directly emitted [particulate matter] PM2.5 and [sulfur dioxide]
SO2. While reductions of PM2.5 and SO2 are not the objective of
the MATS rule, these emission reductions are a direct
consequence of regulating the HAP emissions from EGUs.43

There is nothing unusual about indirect costs and benefits, which
are a normal and anticipated element of regulating in a complex world.
In an influential book published two decades ago that helped call
attention to the importance of indirect regulatory effects, John D.
Graham (who went on to serve as OIRA Administrator under George
W. Bush) and Jonathan B. Wiener collect dozens of examples to make
that point that inefficient regulations can result from ignoring indirect
effects.44 Given the nature of the problems that regulators often face,
and the complex economic, behavioral, environmental, and biological
systems involved, it is hardly surprising that the consequences of major
government actions would flow beyond the narrow confines of direct
effects. Rather, a reasonable regulator should acknowledge and attempt
to anticipate a cascade of possible effects, as both people and
environmental systems respond and adapt to direct regulatory effects.
In recognition of their importance, indirect effects are explicitly
mentioned in the relevant guidance documents, which expressly call
regulators’ attention to this class of regulatory consequences. The
OMB’s Circular A-4 states, “[t]he same standards of information and
analysis quality that apply to direct benefits and costs should be applied
to ancillary benefits and countervailing risks.”45 The EPA’s Guidelines
42.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and
Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 9304,
9305 (Feb. 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60 & 63).

43.

Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. at 24,438.

44.

John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener, Preface to Risk vs. Risk:
Tradeoffs in Protecting Health and the Environment, at xii
(John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1997).

45.

Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 5, at 26.
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for Preparing Economic Analyses likewise explicitly direct the Agency
to consider “ancillary (or co-) benefits and costs.”46
The need to analyze indirect costs and benefits flows naturally from
the purpose of cost–benefit analysis.47 If the goal is to anticipate and
evaluate the consequences of a regulatory decision, there is no reason
to make a distinction between direct and indirect effects; they are both
equally real to the people who are affected by them. Indeed, the primary
value of the concept of indirect regulatory effects is to call agencies’
attention to this class of consequences, thus expanding the scope of
agencies’ analyses so that they are more comprehensive. As noted by
Graham and Weiner, the OMB’s Circular A-4, and the EPA’s
Guidelines, problems arise when an agency’s focus is too narrow, not
too wide. In instances where agencies have failed to heed the relevant
guidance and insisted on departing from standard practice by ignoring
indirect regulatory effects, courts have found their decisions to be
irrational.48
In keeping with the relevant guidance and case law, agencies often
consider the indirect effects of their regulatory decisions. Even when
considering only the EPA, indirect benefits, and Clean Air Act reg–
ulations, examples abound:
•

Reagan Administration: The regulation of toxic emissions from
municipal waste combustors took into account co-benefit
reductions of criteria pollutants.49

46.

EPA, supra note 4, at 11-2. An earlier version of the guidelines also directs
the Agency to consider indirect costs and benefits. See Kimberly M. Castle
& Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Standards, Thresholds, and the Next
Battleground of Climate Change Regulations, 103 Minn. L. Rev. 1349,
1428–29 (2019).

47.

Inst. for Pol’y Integrity, Strengthening Regulatory Review:
Recommendations for the Trump Administration from Former
OIRA Leaders 6 (2016) (“[T]he goal of cost-benefit analysis is to
maximize net benefits for society, which requires . . . consideration of all
reasonable regulatory alternatives and all significant social welfare effects,
including any indirect or difficult-to-quantify costs or benefits.”).

48.

See, e.g., Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety
Admin., 956 F.2d 321, 326–27 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (striking down a NHTSA
fuel-efficiency rule for failing to consider the indirect costs of vehicle-safety
risks); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1225–26 (5th Cir.
1991) (remanding the EPA’s ban on asbestos-containing brakes under the
Toxic Substances Control Act for failure to consider the indirect safety
harms that would accompany non-asbestos brakes).

49.

See Assessment of Municipal Waste Combustor Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 52 Fed. Reg. 25,399, 25,406 (July 7, 1987) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).
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•

George H. W. Bush Administration: The performance
standards for landfill gases took into account co-benefits of
reduced global loadings of methane.50

•

Clinton Administration: The HAP standards from pulp and
paper producers took into account co-benefit reductions in
volatile organic compounds, particulate matter, and carbon
monoxide.51

•

George W. Bush Administration: The Clean Air interstate rule
to control particulate matter and ozone took into account cobenefit reductions in mercury emissions.52

•

Obama Administration: The HAP standards for combustion
engines took Into account indirect benefits from carbon
monoxide, volatile organic compounds, and nitrogen oxides.53

Economic theory, the relevant guidance documents, decades of
bipartisan agency practice, and simple common sense all indicate that
agencies should consider indirect costs and benefits when making
regulatory decisions. Departing from this well-established norm requires
a very good reason.

IV. Extraordinary and Unjustified Departure from
Established Practice
In its latest HAP proposal, the EPA seeks to reverse its 2016
Finding.54 In doing so, it functionally ignores the substantial quantified
benefits of the MATS rule on the grounds that they are not direct
benefits. The EPA suggests that focusing “primarily” on HAP
benefits—as opposed to particulate matter co-benefits—may be the
50.

Standards of Performance for New Stationary Sources and Guidelines for
Control of Existing Sources: Municipal Solid Waste Landfills, 56 Fed. Reg.
24,468, 24,469 (May 30, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51–52, 60).

51.

See National Emission Standard for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source
Category, 63 Fed. Reg. 18,504, 18,585–86 (Apr. 15, 1998) (to be codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts 63, 261, 430).

52.

See Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162, 25,170 (May 12, 2005) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 51, 72–74, 77–78, 96); EPA, R-05-002, Regulatory Impact
Analysis for the Final Clean Air Interstate Rule 1-10 (2005).

53.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for
Reciprocating Internal Combustion Engines, 75 Fed. Reg. 51,570, 51,578
(Aug. 20, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).

54.

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants: Coal- and OilFired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 84 Fed. Reg. 2670, 2674
(proposed Feb. 7, 2019) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).
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“only permissible approach” under § 112(n).55 Alternatively, the EPA
argues that its decision not to consider co-benefits is a “reasonable
approach . . . to considering costs in response to Michigan.”56 On either
grounds, the Agency puts aside the overwhelming evidence that the
MATS rule generates massive net benefits and instead “proposes to
conclude that it is not appropriate and necessary to regulate HAP from
EGUs . . . because the costs of such regulation grossly outweigh the
HAP benefits.”57
As discussed above, guidance documents and prior practices
provide a baseline against which agencies’ analytic choices in individual
rule-making processes can be judged. Where an agency’s methods
depart from the standard practice, it raises a legitimate concern that
cost–benefit analysis is being manipulated to justify a regulatory
decision based on political expediency or other grounds. The larger the
departure, the greater the burden on the agency to provide a reasoned
explanation for its unusual course of action.
In its 2019 HAP proposal, the EPA’s reasoning entirely fails to
justify the extraordinary step of functionally ignoring many billions of
dollars’ worth of regulatory benefits. First, there is nothing in the
language of § 112(n) that indicates that the Agency should limit the
terms of its analysis to direct effects. The provision simply states that
the Administrator is to “regulate electric utility steam generating units
under [§ 112], if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate
and necessary after considering the results of the study required by this
subparagraph.”58 If Congress had intended to limit the EPA’s analysis
to direct regulatory effects, it could simply have said so. It did not, and
it did not do so in the face of an already substantial practice by agencies
of considering indirect costs and benefits. It borders on outlandish to
construe statutory silence in this context to prohibit consideration of
indirect effects. Even the claim that statutory silence permits the
agency to ignore indirect effects is highly implausible.
In addition, the Court’s guidance in Michigan v. EPA on the
appropriate interpretation of § 112(n) runs entirely counter to the
EPA’s approach in the proposal. According to the Court, “‘appropriate’
is ‘the classic broad and all-encompassing term that naturally and
traditionally includes consideration of all the relevant factors.’”59 The
Court also recognized the relevance of “established administrative
practice,” which includes many decades of considering indirect costs
55.

Id. at 2676.

56.

Id. at 2674–76.

57.

Id. at 2676.

58.

Clean Air Act § 112(n)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (2012).

59.

Michigan v. EPA, 135 S. Ct. 2699, 2707 (2015) (quoting White Stallion
Energy Ctr., LLC v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
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and benefits, in interpreting the phrase “appropriate and necessary” in
§ 112(n).60 The Court characterized the Agency’s practice as follows:
“reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the
advantages and the disadvantages of agency decisions.”61 There is no
hint that the “advantages” and “disadvantages” discussed by the Court
are limited to only the direct advantages or disadvantages.62
The Agency’s argument from statutory structure is also extremely
weak, and, indeed, is very similar to the argument it offered and the
Court rejected in Michigan v. EPA. The EPA claimed that since the
statute directs the Agency to conduct a study of the public health
effects of HAP emissions prior to regulating, it should accordingly
exclude co-benefits from its appropriate-and-necessary analysis. In
Michigan v. EPA, the Court heard a similar argument that the Agency
should not consider costs in making its appropriate-and-necessary
finding because the study mandated by § 112(n)(1)(A) focuses
exclusively on public health and does not mention costs.63 The primary
holding of Michigan v. EPA rejects that argument in favor of an
expansive interpretation of § 112(n) that requires the Agency to
examine the whole range of consequences from regulating HAPs, not
merely HAP-related public health effects.
The Court does mention co-benefits in Michigan v. EPA, but only
when expressly decline to address the issue of whether and how cobenefits should be weighed against costs.64 The EPA’s new proposal’s
claim that Michigan v. EPA prohibits consideration of co-benefits is
flatly contradicted by the majority opinion, which made it absolutely
clear that it did not decide the question of how co-benefits should be
treated. Where courts have addressed the issue of co-benefits under

60.

Id. at 2708.

61.

Id. at 2707 (emphasis omitted).

62.

Id. Indeed, the Court emphasized the importance of indirect costs:
In addition, ‘‘cost’’ includes more than the expense of complying
with regulations; any disadvantage could be termed a cost. EPA’s
interpretation precludes the Agency from considering any type of
cost—including, for instance, harms that regulation might do to
human health or the environment. The Government concedes that
if the Agency were to find that emissions from power plants do
damage to human health, but that the technologies needed to
eliminate these emissions do even more damage to human health,
it would still deem regulation appropriate. No regulation is
‘‘appropriate’’ if it does significantly more harm than good.
Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted).

63.

Id. at 2708–09.

64.

Id. at 2711.
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§ 112, they have found that it is entirely appropriate for such benefits
to be considered.65
The Agency argues in the alternative that it is a reasonable exercise
of its discretion to functionally ignore co-benefits when making an
appropriate-and-necessary determination. It should be clear from the
discussion above that this choice is anything but reasonable: it has no
basis in economic theory and it contradicts both the relevant guidance
and decades of agency practice. More to the point, it flouts basic
principles of rationality to claim that a rule is not cost–benefit justified
when it will, in fact, generate tens of billions of dollars of net benefits
every year.
Further exacerbating the irrationality of the Agency’s decision to
functionally ignore indirect benefits is that it counts indirect costs. The
cost estimate in the 2016 Finding, which the Agency does not revisit in
its latest proposal, includes costs “beyond the costs borne by owners of
coal- and oil-fired units regulated by MATS.”66 This is the definition of
indirect costs.67 The irrationality of accounting for indirect costs while
ignoring indirect benefits should be obvious.68 This contradiction arises
in part because the terms “benefits” and “costs” are in fact merely labels
65.

E.g., U.S. Sugar Corp. v. EPA, 830 F.3d 579, 625–26 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(“Section 7412(d)(4)’s text does not foreclose the Agency from considering
co-benefits and doing so is consistent with the [Clean Air Act]’s purpose—
to reduce the health and environmental impacts of hazardous air
pollutants.”).

66.

Supplemental Finding That It Is Appropriate and Necessary to Regulate
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam
Generating Units, 81 Fed. Reg. 24,420, 24,439–40 (Apr. 25, 2016) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).

67.

Id. Direct costs are “those costs that fall directly on regulated entities as
the result of the imposition of a regulation.” EPA, supra note 4, at 8-7.
Indirect costs, meanwhile, are those “incurred in related markets or
experienced by consumers or government agencies not under the direct
scope of the regulation.” Id. at 8-7 to -8.

68.

See Natalie Jacewicz & Richard L. Revesz, EPA Is Rolling Back
Protections with Methodology No Respectable Economist Would Endorse,
The Hill, (Mar. 4, 2019, 12:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/energyenvironment/432471-epa-is-rolling-back-protections-with-methodology-norespectable [https://perma.cc/9H4P-S4SV] (“It is difficult to imagine a
more arbitrary and capricious methodology than a rule under which EPA
must take into account the indirect consequences of regulation if they are
negative but must ignore them if they are positive.”); Christopher C.
DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Rationalism in Regulation, 108 Mich.
L. Rev. 877, 888 (2010) (“There appear to be no legal, political, or
intellectual . . . impediments to treating ancillary benefits and
countervailing risks equally in cost-benefit analysis.”); Samuel J. Rascoff
& Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards
Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1763, 1793 (2002) (“Risk tradeoffs and ancillary benefits are simply
mirror images of each other.”).
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of convenience, and agencies sometimes also refer to benefits as
“negative costs.”69 Failing to account for indirect benefits is, by
definition, the failure to account for indirect negative costs. The Agency
provides no reason why some indirect costs are accounted for and others
are not.
Where agencies have engaged in similar behavior in the past by
“put[ting] a thumb on the scale by undervaluing the benefits and over–
valuing the costs,”70 or “inconsistently and opportunistically fram[ing]”
a rule’s advantages and disadvantages,71 courts have rejected this clear
violation of norms of rationality. The EPA’S HAP proposal departs
from decades of practice, relevant guidance, and common sense. The
EPA provides no reason to believe that Congress intended the Agency
to do so; if anything, the language of § 112 and the Court’s inter–
pretation of that language indicate that the EPA cannot lawfully ignore
a massive category of regulatory effects.

V. Cost-Benefit Analysis in a Dark Time
If the treatment of co-benefits in the EPA’s proposal were an
isolated incident of departing from standard cost–benefit practices, it
would be bad enough. But the reality is that the Trump Administration
has taken a host of steps that show its disregard for longstanding norms
of good governance and informed regulatory decision making. Almost
immediately after taking office, President Trump issued Executive
Order 13,771, which directs each agency to repeal at least two existing
regulations before issuing a new regulation, and imposes a regulatory
budget that sets a cap on additional regulatory costs at zero.72 These
requirements encourage agencies to focus exclusively on regulatory
costs, rather than the traditional goal of maximizing net benefits, and
impose a set of direct, formalistic, and inflexible mandates that are
highly unlikely to facilitate higher quality regulations or promote the
sensible evaluation of existing rules.73 Other moves include attempting
to disregard important public health studies, which have informed the
Agency’s cost–benefit analyses for decades, under the guise of scientific

69.

EPA, EPA-420-D-09-003, Draft Regulatory Impact Analysis:
Proposed Rulemaking to Establish Light-Duty Vehicle
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards and Corporate Average
Fuel Economy Standards, at xiii (2009).

70.

Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538
F.3d 1172, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008).

71.

Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

72.

Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9,339 (Feb. 3, 2017).

73.

See Caroline Cecot & Michael A. Livermore, The One-In, Two-Out
Executive Order Is a Zero, 166 U. Penn. L. Rev. Online 1, 2, 9 (2017).
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“transparency,”74 and abandoning the current best estimate for the
social costs of greenhouse gas emissions.75
The consequences of these moves for the future of cost–benefit
analysis are far from clear. The Trump Administration has had an
abysmal record of defending its regulatory decisions in court, in part
because of its willingness to ignore longstanding rules of administrative
practice, including by failing to engage in rigorous analysis of costs and
benefits.76 These failures might demonstrate to future administrations
that they should hew more closely to established norms. On the other
hand, activists, commentators, and some scholars have suggested that,
since the Trump Administration has been unwilling to operate within
the normal constraints, a future Democratic administration should feel
similarly unconstrained.77
The prisoners’ dilemma provides a rough analogy to the situations
facing the parties with respect to cost-benefit analysis, and other norms
that govern how politics should interact with agency decision making.
In the setup of the prisoners’ dilemma, two strategic actors face
different payoffs depending on whether they defect from an agreement
with a conspirator, and whether the conspirator defects. There is no
way for the two conspirators to coordinate with each other. The payoffs
are structured so that jointly, the conspirators are better off co–
operating; but no matter what the other conspirator does, each

74.

Madison E. Condon et al., Assessing the Rationale for the U.S. EPA’s
Proposed “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science” Rule, 14
Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 131 (2019).

75.

Richard Revesz et al., Best Cost Estimate of Greenhouse Gases, 357
Science 655, 655 (2017).

76.

See Connor Raso, Trump’s Deregulatory Efforts Keep Losing in Court—
And the Losses Could Make It Harder for Future Administrations to
Deregulate, Brookings (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/trumps-deregulatory-efforts-keep-losing-in-court-and-the-lossescould-make-it-harder-for-future-administrations-to-deregulate/ [https://
perma.cc/N7PV-KPW8].

77.

See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, Can Technocracy Be Saved? An Interview
with Cass Sunstein, Vox (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/2018/10/22/18001014/cass-sunstein-cost-benefit-analysis-technocracyliberalism [https://perma.cc/B4JE-LJCU]. Matthews noted a common
concern:
I hear that sentiment a lot . . . that liberals and leftists are being
hampered by the generosity of their principles, that they need to
learn to play dirtier and can’t afford to hamstring themselves by,
say, subjecting their policies to cost-benefit analysis when faced
with a figure like Trump who’s not hamstrung by anything.
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also David LaRoss, CPR Seeks Cost-Benefit
Overhaul to Reform Federal Rulemaking Process, Inside EPA (Dec. 30,
2019), https://insideepa.com/environment-next-news/cpr-seeks-cost-benefitoverhaul-reform-federal-rulemaking-process [https://perma.cc/YEV4-9YA9].
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conspirator, individually, is better off defecting. For obvious reasons,
this setup makes it difficult to maintain cooperation over time.
There is a well-known experiment by political scientist Robert
Axelrod that showed how, especially under uncertainty in repeated
game situations, the best strategy in a prisoners’ dilemma is “tit-fortat.” That strategy begins with a cooperative move but immediately
defects at the first sign of bad faith by the other prisoner.78 One of the
optimistic interpretations of Axelrod’s results is that, under certain
conditions, a mutually beneficial equilibrium is at least possible, with a
group of tit-for-tat players all engaging in cooperative behavior. The
downside is that this equilibrium can be unstable, with a few bad actors
driving everyone else toward defection.
The Trump Administration is the non-cooperative actor that might
ruin what has been a beneficial cooperative equilibrium for the
American public. By defecting from the tacit agreement between
administrations of both parties to carry out cost–benefit analyses within
the range of accepted norms, the current administration has de–
stabilized a situation that has existed for decades. While it is possible
that a future Democrat administration might just ignore this defection
and return to the cooperative state of the pre-Trump years, it is also
possible that it might continue to follow the Trump Administration’s
defection strategy, initiating a sequence of events that, in the end, does
away with cost–benefit analysis altogether.

78.

Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 31–33, 121–23
(1984).
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